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Abstract:  
This article explores what factors determine the decision of a patent pool to accept new inputs. We 
propose a dynamic analysis of 1337 U.S. patent inputs into 7 important pools. This analysis 
highlights a trade-off between firm and patent characteristics as the determinants of inclusion of 
patents into pools. For instance we prove that firms already member of the pool or holding large 
patent portfolios are able to include lower quality patents. These findings can be explained both by 
bargaining power and information asymmetry. In particular, as measured by a new indicator, 
insiders and firms practicing the technology file patents that are better aligned with the criteria of 
essentiality. 
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Introduction 
 
Many important standards incorporate proprietary technology that can be licensed from patent 
pools. Patent pools are agreements between different patent holders to offer joint licenses for a 
bundle of patents. There have been patent pools since the early 19th century, but only since the 
successful launch of the MPEG24 and DVD patent pools in 1997 and 1999 the phenomenon is 
evolving at breathtaking speed. Patent pools are today a phenomenon of increasing and undeniable 
importance in ICT (Information, Communication and Telecommunication) technologies. Modern 
mobile phones, DVD or mp3 players, receivers for digital TV…: all these high tech consumer 
goods use technology that can be licensed from patent pools. The value of products produced 
under pool licenses by now exceeds 100 billion US dollar per year even taking into account only 
the US market (Clarkson, 2004). 
 
There are many advantages of this type of organizations. Patent pools can help reducing the 
adverse effects resulting from the fact that technological standards incorporate an increasing 
amount of technologies protected by patents (Shapiro, 2001). One aspect of this patent 
proliferation is the « patent thicket » problem5. The patent thicket describes a situation in which 
holders of different patents that are all necessary for complying with a standard mutually block 
each other in the implementation of the standard. Another advantage of pools highlighted by the 
economic literature is to reduce the transaction costs by cutting down the number of licenses 
needed by firms without patents who wish to produce products that comply with the standard. The 
last advantage of patent pools is to reduce the multiple marginalization problem6. This problem 
arises if different firms have market power over complementary inputs, such as different patents 
necessary for complying with the same standard, and fix prices independently of each other. 
 
Nonetheless, although the pools can help reducing transaction costs and the multiple 
marginalization problem, they also have drawbacks. The main threat is the possibility that firms 
use the pool for anticompetitive behaviors (Carlson, 1999). In fact, competition authorities monitor 
pool creation very closely.  
                                                 
4 MPEG2 is a data compression technology of moving pictures used e.g. in digital television, Internet streaming, 
DVDs etc. 
5 The creator of this term defines the patent thicket as « a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that 
a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology. » (Shapiro, 2001). 
6 This problem was first analyzed by Cournot (1838) as « the exercise of market power at successive vertical layers in 
a supply chain ».   
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The main concern for competition emphasized by the literature is the introduction of unnecessary 
or substitutable patents. For substitutable patents, the risk is that the pool can be used as a price 
fixing mechanism or help to foreclose competition by introducing a patent and excluding its 
substitute. In order to avoid these problems, Lerner and Tirole (2004) underline that it is necessary 
that a pool be formed only of complementary patents.  
 
The effects of introducing unnecessary or substitutable patents are controversially discussed. For 
example Gilbert (2009) states that if the pool contains at least one essential good quality patent, the 
introduction of new patents even of poor quality or non essential, without increasing the level of 
royalties, should not deteriorate the consumer welfare. On the other hand, the inclusion of 
unnecessary patents into a pool would have the effect to mitigate the advantages of pools for 
holders of valuable patents. This could result in two important drawbacks. The first one is to 
reduce the return on technologically significant patents and thus to discourage the innovation 
efforts. The second potential adverse effect is that holders of good quality patents are less inclined 
to join the pool. Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008) find that pools attracting low value patents tend to 
have fewer members and firms with higher value patent portfolio are less likely to join them. 
Consequently, pools are less likely to be exhaustive and to effectively reduce transaction costs and 
multiple marginalization problems.  
 
The problem of strategic inputs into pools has been recently highlighted by several scholars. 
Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008) underline the fact that many pools create the incentive to add a 
high number of patents. Lampe and Moser (2009) analyze the incentive effects of a patent pool for 
sewing machines in the 19th century. They find that while patent applications increased, there is no 
observable increase in innovation. They conclude that this finding lends credit to the hypothesis 
that pools induce an increase in strategically motivated patent applications. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis of strategic patent inputs into pools using data 
from contemporary patent pools. We have produced a unique dataset on the timing of patent 
introduction into several of the most important pools that currently exist. Furthermore, we make 
use of technical documents to construct a novel indicator for the relative importance of a standard 
for a patent.  
 
We will highlight patterns of patent introduction providing sufficient evidence for strategic 
behaviors. This paper shows that a majority of patents in pools have been introduced after its 
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creation. Only a minority of these late patent introductions can be explained by new patent holders 
joining the pool. We find that the value of patents introduced by pool members decreases with 
time. These findings could also be explained by technological reasons. For instance, one could 
argue that late patent inputs relate to incremental amendments to the underlying standard. 
However, we find that patents introduced late are essential to increasingly broad parts of the 
standard. Among patents filed late, those patents that have the broadest essentiality claim on the 
standard are of the lowest quality. Therefore we argue that the decline in patent value over time is 
not explained by technological reasons, and more explicitly by the fact that the pool increases to 
include incremental improvements upon the standard. These results lend credit to the suspicion 
that pools provide an additional incentive for strategic patent files. We address directly the 
question of strategic inputs. Testing a range of firm characteristics, we find that insiders introduce 
patents of lower quality. These findings could be explained by bargaining power and information 
asymmetries. We find arguments and empirical evidence for both explanations. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a review of economic 
theory on pools. Section 2 deals with the methodology of the paper and the presentation of the 
data. Section 3 presents a quick overview over the interest and novelty of our data to establish new 
findings. Section 4 explains our main results on the importance of firms’ characteristics for the 
inclusion of patents in pools. Section 5 presents our main results on the importance of information 
asymmetry to understand changes in quality of patents included in a pool.  
 
 
I. Stylized facts and theoretical background 
 
The economic literature on patent pools discusses the possibility that a pool creates incentive for 
strategic patent files.  For instance Lampe and Moser (2009) find evidence for strategic patent files 
motivated by the expectation of a patent pool. Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008) contend that pools 
may provide incentives to multiply the number of patent files and may allow at least some pool 
members to introduce into the pool a high number of patents of limited technological and 
economic value. In particular certain royalty distribution schemes could be thought of to encourage 
the multiplication of patents. 
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Revenue-sharing rules 
 
Not all patent pools collect royalties. For example, the Bluetooth pool has a royalty-free licensing 
rule. In this case, introduction of patents into the pools is driven by non-monetary incentives, such 
as the access to other firms’ technology. However, all pools collecting royalties have rules on how 
these royalties are shared between members. There is no public requirement on which revenue 
sharing rule a pool must adopt. Therefore members can agree on whatever rules they want. Layne-
Farrar and Lerner (2008) identify two main types of sharing rules: numeric proportional rules and 
value proportional rules. Both rules provide important incentives to firms for increasing their share 
of patents in the pool. 
 
The numeric proportional rule is founded on a division of earnings based on the number of 
essential patents in the pool. All the pools administered by MPEG LA use this revenue sharing 
rule. A variant of this rule is the revenue sharing rule of the MPEG 2 patent pool in which the 
calculation of the number of essential patents is weighted by country. The numeric proportional 
rule has a direct impact on the incentives to introduce large number of patents because each new 
patent increases the part of revenue allocated to its holder.  
 
The value added rule exists in several variants. The first possibility is a negotiation that determines 
what share of revenue each contributor receives. The second possibility is a royalty sharing rule 
based on determinants such as the age of patents, the number of claims, the number of times the 
patents are infringed, or the part of the standard these patents are essential for. In this case, the 
number of patents taken into account for the calculation of the share of revenue is weighted by 
some indicators of patent quality. The value added rule was for example adopted by the DVD 6C 
patent pool. 
 
Even though the value added rule weights the number of patents by some indicators of patent 
quality, it still provides incentives to firms to increase their share of patents in the pool. The 
business review letter7 of the DVD6C pool states: « The formula that will determine the royalty 
allocation is based on how many of each Licensor's "essential" patents are infringed. Thus, 
although the formula weights the patent count with other factors, each Licensor will benefit 
monetarily from the exclusion of other Licensors' non-"essential" patents and accordingly has a 
                                                 
7 Available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm 
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strong incentive to encourage the expert to review other Licensors' patents critically, and to bring 
to the expert's attention any patents that have ceased to be "essential." ».  
It is thus straightforward why companies could have incentives to introduce a high number of 
patents into a pool. As a further step, it is necessary to analyze whether the rules of pools provide 
sufficient safeguards against strategic inputs.  
 
The rules governing inclusion of patents into patent pools  
 
In order to be introduced in a pool, a patent has to be « essential » to the underlying standard. In 
order to ensure the essentiality of the patents, and thus the compliance of patents with the criteria 
adopted by the pool, patent pools usually have a third party evaluator that establishes essentiality 
reports. The evaluator’s work is to analyze the patent and to declare whether this patent is 
« essential » according to the criteria of essentiality chosen by this particular pool.  
 
There are several factors to consider in order to understand if essentiality evaluation is a sufficient 
safeguard against strategic patent inputs into pools. If the essentiality report is objective and the 
criteria of evaluation are well-defined, no patent that is not essential to the standard should be 
included into the pool. For several reasons essentiality reports may not rule out the possibility that 
pools attract and accept low value patents. 
  
First, it is difficult to ascertain that essentiality reports are impartial and objective in all cases. 
Patent evaluators are appointed by the pool administrator and paid by the patent holders. As the 
procedure is non-contentious, there are little safeguards provided against pool policy 
considerations influencing the evaluation. In several cases of litigation, licensees have accused 
patent evaluators to be overly lax in their evaluation of allegedly essential patents.8 Furthermore, 
not in all pools members are forced to consult the expert. The MPEG 2 pool stipulates: « The 
licensors are bound by the expert’s opinion. However, they need not consult the expert if they 
agree unanimously in good faith that a submitted patent is an essential patent or that a portfolio 
patent is not essential». Contrariwise, in other pools such as DVD 6C, the expert decision is 
required: « The agreement provides that the expert's determinations are "conclusive and non-
                                                 
8 This claim is raised as patent misuse defence in many patent infringement cases, e.g. by disc replicator ODS in its 
litigation MPEGLA over the MPEG2 patent pool; Landgericht Düsseldorf Urteil vom 30. November 2006, Az. 4b O 
346/05; V. b) cc);  
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appealable," although the expert must submit a report explaining any decision that a patent was not 
"essential". » 
 
Second, the criteria of the essentiality evaluation are not necessarily aligned with the general 
quality of the patent. Essential patents can still be of low technological or economic value. For 
instance owners of an essential technology often can choose to protect it by one large or several 
narrow patents. Each of these numerous narrow patents may still be necessarily infringed by any 
implementation of the standard and comply with the criteria of essentiality of the respective pool.  
 
Finally the criteria of essentiality are not always exactly the same and may be endogenous: the 
definition of patent essentiality is a subject of debate; but two mains interpretations emerge from 
the literature and the decisions of competition authorities (Gilbert, 2009).  The first one focuses on 
technical essentiality. This first interpretation was used by the Department Of Justice (hereafter 
DOJ) in the 1997 business review letter for the MPEG 2 patent pool9, which emphasizes: « there is 
no technical alternative to any of the portfolio patents within the standard ». Whereas in this first 
interpretation essentiality is purely a matter of technology, a second – broader – definition includes 
criteria of economic feasibility. As to this definition, patents are essential not only if there is no 
technological alternative, but also if an available technological alternative is so costly that it is 
impossible to implement the standard at a competitive cost without using the patent. This broader 
definition includes all patents « necessarily infringed » as a practical matter by compliance with 
the standard specifications.  
 
In practice, pools have a considerable margin in choosing their criteria of essentiality. For 
example, in the case of DVD 6C, essentiality is defined as follows: « A Licensor's patent is 
"essential" […] if it is "necessarily infringed," or "there is no realistic alternative" to it "in 
implementing the DVD Standard Specifications». Whereas the DVD 6C pool thus implements a 
definition of essentiality as a practical matter, the MPEG 2 pool sticks to the more narrow criteria 
of technical essentiality. In the MPEG 2 pool, an essential patent is defined as « any patent 
claiming an apparatus and/or a method necessary for compliance with the MPEG 2 standard under 
the laws of the country which issued or published the patent. ». Even if we believe that the patent 
evaluator makes an absolutely correct job in evaluating objectively all patents according to the 
criteria of essentiality chosen by pool members, we still can think that the pool members choose 
these criteria bearing in mind which criteria would fit best their patent portfolio.  
                                                 
9 Available at : http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf 
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We have thus found characteristics of patent pools providing incentives for introducing low value 
patents. The procedures of accepting patents may for several reasons not rule out the possibility 
that low value patents are incorporated into pools. 
 
II. Methodology 
 
Even though some commentators suggest that pools may increase the number of low value patents, 
there is to date no reliable evidence. If the number and quality of essential patents is endogenous to 
pools, this does not necessarily imply that patents in pools are in average of lower quality than 
other patents. Besides the potentially negative incentive effect, one expects pools to have a positive 
selection effect: Patents essential to technological standards are generally found to be of higher 
value than other patents, because SSOs tend to select the best technologies. As patents included in 
pools are by force of law required to be essential, patents included are expected to be of higher 
value than the average patent. Delcamp (2009) underlines the link between essentiality and quality 
showing that pool patents in general receive more citations than control patents presenting the 
same characteristics.  
 
We thus suggest going a step further by analyzing patent quality with respect to the owners of the 
patent and the timing of their introduction. In particular, we argue that if patent introduction and 
acceptation is strategically motivated, we should be able to find a difference between patents 
introduced into the pool by firms with different characteristics. We thus expect to find that insiders 
or powerful firms are able to introduce patents of lower quality into pools than firms with weaker 
bargaining power or outsiders. 
 
Data 
 
We have produced a unique database of 7 patent pools with 8046 patent observations: DVD6C, 
MPEG2, MPEG4 Systems, MPEG4 Visuals, AVC H/264, IEEE 1394 and DVB-T. Some (few) 
patents are included in several pools; for our purpose the same patent in different pools is treated 
like different patent observations. Furthermore patents sometimes change the designation by which 
they are identified on patent lists (from application number to grant number) or are dropped (by 
expiry or retrieval of the holder). For these reasons the number of patent observations is higher 
than the number of patents currently included in the seven pools (around 5000). 
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We retrieve the patent numbers and the name of patent holders from the lists available on the 
websites of the pools10. We check using Internet Archives11 when the patent first appeared on the 
list of pool patents. Patent pool managers regularly update the lists of pool patents on their 
websites. Like any other information of the site, these data are stored in Internet Archives. 
Comparing current with previous lists allows identifying the date when a patent is first listed as 
part of the pool. This date will in the following be called the date of input.  
 
We match the 1337 US patents in our sample with the NBER database and thus obtain a full range 
of information on the patents, and especially the number of claims, forward and backward cites 
(forward cites count the number of times a patent is cited by ulterior patents, backward cites count 
the number of previous patents cited by a patent), patent generality, technological class, and grant 
and application year. In order to deal with truncation problems and missing observations, we 
completed the dataset using the web service of the European Patent Office12. Using these 
databases, we also retrieve the size of the patent family. The patent family is defined as the group 
of patents sharing the same priority number.  
 
You can see on the following graph the number of U.S. American patents per pool. On the graph, 
the preponderant number of patents in the DVD6C patent pools becomes apparent. In order to rule 
out that some of our findings are only due to characteristics that are specific to this pool, we test all 
our hypotheses also on a sample excluding DVD6C (results in the annex).  
872149
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DVD 6C
MPEG 4
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Figure 1 : Number of U.S. patents / pool 
 
                                                 
10 www.mpegla.com (MPEG2, MPEG4 Systems, MPEG4 Systems, AVC, IEEE 1394), www.dvd6cla.com (DVD6C), 
www.sisvel.com (dvb-t) 
11 www.archive.org  
12 www.espacenet.com  
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We dispose for each patent of four important dates: application date, grant date, date of pool 
creation and date of introduction into the pool. From these dates are drawn our age variables: 
patent age is the difference between today and the grant date, input age is the difference between 
date of input and pool creation date, age at input is the difference between date of input and grant 
date, age at creation is the difference between the date of pool creation and grant date (which can 
be positive or negative). We further obtain a dummy variable late application which is one for all 
patents applied after creation of the pool. 
 
Indicators 
 
Many aspects of our theory deal with patent quality or value. As patent quality is at the core of our 
research hypotheses, the choice of the indicator of patent quality is crucial. Layne-Farrar and 
Lerner (2008) in their empirical assessment of patent pools use forward cites as an indicator of 
patent quality. Simcoe (2008) as well uses forward cites when he compares patent quality of 
patents incorporated into standards with the average quality of patents.  
 
The general argument is that a patent receiving more follow-up citations has proven to be 
important for ulterior research; it is thus more likely to be a fundamental invention and to carry 
important technological know-how. Harhoff, Narin, Scherer and Vopel (1997) find that patents 
more cited are also perceived as more valuable by their owners in survey data; Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2001) find that patents receiving more citations indeed are more correlated with firm 
value and Giummo (2003) finds on a sample of German patents that patents cited more often 
generate higher royalty revenue. 
 
Economists have thought about a potential bias resulting from citations a patent receives from 
patents of the same patent holder13. To exclude any bias and in line with most empirical research 
on patent value, we use citations received by patents except citations from the same firm. To be 
sure, we check and find that our results are not sensitive to using all cites instead. 
 
More worrying in our context is that Hall et al. found that in technology classes where 
complementary innovations are important, such as ITC technologies, patent citations are less likely 
to work properly as indicators of patent value. In order to deal with this problem, we distinguish 
forward and backward cites that are among patents in the same pool (internal cites). External cites 
are accordingly defined as citations a patent receives from ulterior patents that are not included 
                                                 
13 Hall et al. 
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into the same pool. All results are provided for external cites and all not-self-cites (called from 
now on all citations for the ease of exposition). 
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Figure 2 : Internal and external cites 
 
A further problem of patent citations as indicator in economic analysis is that patent citations 
happen over time and the NBER citation database ends at 2006. In order to control for this 
truncation problem, we control for patent age and check the robustness of our results by dropping 
patents applied after 2003. We use different methods of correcting for patent age and application 
year effects, such as using application year dummies14.  
 
Patent cites are a widely accepted indicator of patent quality. But this indicator has also sometimes 
been criticized, and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2002) suggest using a compounded indicator 
composed of forward cites, backward cites, number of claims and family size.  
 
Family size is often accepted as carrying a message on patent value; as each patent file to a foreign 
patent office is costly. A patent that is filed to many patent offices is thus likely to be of bigger 
expected financial value to its owner. Of course the presence of a pool may fundamentally flaw 
this reasoning, as a pool with numerical proportionality rule provides endogenous incentives to file 
patents. For this reason we will use family size as a robustness check only.  
 
The second alternative indicator is the number of claims. The number of claims is sometimes used 
as alternative indicator of patent value. In our context, the number of claims is representative of 
something very specific: we argue that one way to multiply the number of patents in the pool and 
thus the firm’s share in the royalty streams is to file many narrow patents instead of few large 
patents. This strategy should clearly be observable using the number of claims.  
                                                 
14 See Annex, including discussion of Simcoe etc. 
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At some point we use patent generality as control variable and in summary statistics. Patent 
generality is defined as the HHI (the Hirschman Herfindhal Index measures the share of 
observations in a sample that relate to the n biggest individuals) of the different classes of the 
patents cited by the patent. 
 
To finish the analysis of patents, we construct a novel indicator for the breadth of the essentiality 
claim. As discussed earlier, the patent essentiality reports indicate the standard sections for which 
each patent is essential. Summaries of the essentiality reports carried through by independent 
patent experts are available on the pools’ websites. These summaries indicate the sections and 
subsections of the standard document for which the respective patent is essential. We count these 
sections and subsections and correct by the median of the numbers of patents in the same pool 
(respectively in the same licensing program for pools with several distinct licensing programs). 
 
The indicator we use for subsequent analysis is the corrected number of sections; but the number 
of subsections and the not corrected numbers are used for robustness checks. The corrected 
number of sections divided by the number of claims is our variable for focus of the patent on the 
standard. The number of sections is an indicator of the broadness of the essentiality claim, the 
number of claims of the patent is an indicator of the broadness of the patent. The quotient is thus 
an indicator of the relative weight of the standard-relevant claims in the patent. 
 
Regression methodology 
 
The number of forward cites, claims and patents in the same family are non-negative integers. We 
use usual count data regression instruments, for instance poisson and negative binomial 
regressions15. Our new indicator for the focus on the standard is bound to be positive and the 
density of distribution is almost strictly decreasing with the value, with very few extremely high 
values (see distribution graph in the annex). Standard OLS is thus not adapted to regressions with 
focus_standard as explained variable, and once again we use count data methodology. 
 
III. Descriptive Findings 
 
 
An important aspect of pools that has so far received practically no academic attention is the 
growth over time. The only exception is case study evidence collected by Aoki & Nagaoka (2004) 
                                                 
15 Wooldridge, 2002 
 14
on coalition formation. By contrast, our dataset provides novel quantitative information on the 
timing of patent pools which allows econometric approaches and yields new insights.  
 
The following graphs illustrate the growth path of two important pools.  
 
Figure 3 : DVD 6C pool patents as to country of patent 
file 
Figure 4: MPEG 2 pool patents as to country of 
patent file 
 
The following chart provides an overview over all the patent pools in our sample. As can be seen, 
the big majority of U.S. patents that are currently in these pools have been added to the pool at 
some point after its launch (in blue). 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
IEE
E 1
39
4
DV
D 
6C
MP
EG
 2
MP
EG
 4 
sy
ste
ms
MP
EG
 4 
vis
ua
l
av
c
dv
b-t
Founding patents
Not founding patents
 
Figure 4 : U.S. founding patents / pool 
 
These graphs provide some evidence on the changes of pools over time. There is a spectacular 
increase in the number of patents in the years after the creation of the pool. In our database, much 
more than half of the patents have been added to the pool after it was launched.  
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Neither mergers of pools nor joining of new pool members provide sufficient explanations for this 
increase in patents over time. We verify immediately that this strong increase is only to a very 
small extent due to new pool members. The following chart looks only at U.S. patents introduced 
in the pools after their launch. In the big majority of cases, these patents introduced at a later stage 
are owned by companies that already before held patents in the same pool. Only a very small share 
(with the exception of MPEG 2) of patents introduced late into the pools can be explained by new 
members joining the pool.  
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Figure 5 : Part of patents introduction not explained by new pool members 
 
As explained in the precedent subsection, our data on the patents’ date of introduction into the 
pools allows us to establish new findings based on the timing of introduction. Given the above 
results (the majority of patents are included after the pools’ creation and by companies already 
members of the pool), it seems logical to analyze the technological quality of the numerous patents 
introduced late.  
 
As discussed, various features of pools as they are currently designed seem to encourage pool 
members to increase their number of patents. In a non-cooperative setting, the introduction of 
numerous low quality patents by one firm could induce other pool members to do the same in 
order to keep their share in the pool revenue. 
 
But also alternative possible explanations need to be taken into consideration. First of all, 
standards evolve over time and continue to evolve when the industry has started implementing 
them. Minor changes to standard specifications or adoption of new annexes and new specifications 
can incorporate new proprietary technology, which justifies the inclusion of new patents into 
existing pools. The growth of patent pools could thus entirely be explained by technological 
amendments to the standard. If a standard is continuously modified to incorporate incremental 
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improvements, proprietary technology included is of minor importance compared to the core of the 
standard. It could thus be a plausible explanation for a variation of patents’ quality over time.  
 
We have thus two different sets of explanations for the increasing number of patent. In order to 
control for the technological explanation (variation of patents’ quality explained by incremental 
improvements), we introduce a patent generality index. Indeed, we expect patents protecting 
incremental improvements to be less general, so this control should capture the effect of the 
narrowing scope of ongoing standardization. In order to analyze the possible link between patents’ 
quality and timing of introduction, we run the following regression.  
( ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; )
pp p p p p p p c py
Q f α η β δ ϕ γ λ φ ε=   (I) 
 
pQ  : Quality of patent p 
pα  : Age input of the patent p 
pβ  : Technology class effect 
pδ  : Patent age effect 
pϕ  : Application year effect 
p
γ  : Citing year effect 
pλ  : Patent generality index 
cφ  : Vector of control dummy variables for patent pools 
 
We successively test this hypothesis on the total number of citations (allnscites), the number of 
external cites, the number of claims and the family size of the patent. We run successively Poisson 
and negative binomial estimates on each indicator. We run these regressions on patents included 
by companies already member of the pool. Indeed, we will argue that pool outsiders might have 
deviating incentives or are constrained in their capacity to introduce low quality patents. In order 
to control for the patents’ characteristics (age, citing year and application year), we use the 
approach proposed by Mehta, Rysman and Simcoe (2008) based on the assumption that the 
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citation age process begins when a patent is granted. This alternative approach allows to control, in 
the same regression, for the age, citation year and application year effect of the patent.16 
 
As we can see in table 1 the quality of patents included in the pool decreases over time. This result 
is significant for 3 out of 4 indicators used in this paper. Even if the result based on the number of 
cites may be questionable (because the number of cites increase over time), having several 
indicators pointing in the same sense confirms our first result: the quality of pools’ patents 
decreases over time. 
Table 1 : Equation 1 results with generality inde
                                                 
16 For a discussion of this hypothesis, see : Mehta, Rysman, Simcoe, «Identifying the age profile of patent citations», 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 
  
Poisson All 
citations 
Negative 
binomial All 
citations 
Poisson 
External 
cites 
Negative 
binomial 
External 
cites 
Poisson 
number 
claims 
Negative 
binomial 
number_claims 
Poisson 
Family 
size 
Negative 
binomial 
Family size 
Model 2 : Regressions with generality index 
Age input  -0.00971***   -0.00912***  - 0.00785** - 0.00718***  -0.00439 -0.00422 -0.01091 - 0.00699* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 
Age patent  0.16905***  0.18357**   0.15985***  0.17642**   0.01037 0.01817 -0.30259  - 0.20426* 
 (0.05) (0.061) (0.047) (0.055) (0.047) (0.053) (0.176) (0.081) 
Citing year  0.33305***    0.36415*** 0.34801***    0.38208***  -0.00033 0.00607 -0.20135 -0.08164 
 (0.079) (0.094) (0.076) (0.091) (0.086) (0.096) (0.197) (0.115) 
Technologic
al class effect - 0.0021* - 0.00235*   - 0.00186** - 0.00202**    -0.00225** - 0.00247***   -0.00073 -0.00051 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Application 
year effect 0.00884 -0.00616 -0.00738 -0.01131 -0.03924 -0.04828 -0.29737   - 0.13129   . 
 (0.076) (0.068) (0.074) (0.064) (0.070) (0.072) (0.23) (0.139) 
Patent 
generality 0.03818 0.13761 -0.15368 -0.15384 -0.08599 -0.08608 0.77843 0.70735 
 (0.222) (0.252) (0.155) (0.161) (0.181) (0.171) (0.484) (0.363) 
Constant  -663.971***    -726.299*** - 693.510***  - 761.826***  4.249 -8.573 409.696 168.88 
  (157.681) (188.18) (152.55) (182.247) (173.272) (192.506) (396.155) (230.321) 
Regressions based on equation 1 with robust standard errors. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Pool dummy 
control variables not reported. 
 18
 
The result is confirmed with 3 out of 4 indicators even though we control for patent generality.  
Furthermore, later we will see that patents with a narrow essentiality claim are actually of better 
quality than other patents in the same pool, which is in contradiction with the technological 
explanation. We can thus argue that the quality of pool patents decrease over time and that this 
decline can not only be explained by the technological explanation. 
 
To summarize, we have drawn three rather strong findings from the data. A majority of patents in 
the pools has been added after the launch of the licensing program, insiders stand for a majority of 
these late patent inputs, and the quality of patents introduced by insiders declines over time. These 
findings lend credit to the suspicion that firms introduce strategic patents in order to increase their 
share in the pool. In the next section, we will develop a set of hypotheses that allow testing more 
directly this suspicion against the data. 
 
 
IV. Do firm characteristics matter? 
 
Hypotheses 
 
In order to establish the existence of strategic driving factors of patent introduction into pools, we 
will in this section suggest a set of research hypotheses. These hypotheses lead to a couple of 
equations that can be tested against the data. We argue that a theory of strategic patent 
introductions into patent pools makes sense only if companies have a differential capacity of 
strategic patent inputs. Strategic patent inputs only have an impact on the distribution of pool 
income if some pool members are able to increase their share on the expense of others.  
 
Our general hypothesis is therefore that the probability for a patent to be accepted by a pool is 
dependent on who owns the patent. We thus assume that the evaluation of a patent’s essentiality is 
not an absolutely exogenous criterion, but that the pool has some margin in selecting patents. More 
concretely, we assume that the pool operates a binary decision of accepting or refusing the patent 
( [0,1]I = ). This decision is dependent upon two factors: the characteristics of the patent (P), and 
the characteristics of the patent holder (X).  
( , )I f X P
+ +=    (1) 
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X and P are vectors of parameters. The parameters are sorted so that the relationships between P 
and I and X and I are positive by definition: X is defined as the ability of firm X to introduce 
patents of given characteristics into a pool, and P is defined as the attractiveness or intrinsic value 
of a patent for a pool. Patents accepted by the pool ( 1Iπ = ) are easily observable, as it is the group of 
patents included in the pool. Patents not accepted by the pool ( 0Iπ = ) are unobservable. This group 
includes patents submitted to the pool for evaluation and refused by the evaluator, but also the 
patents that their holder did not submit because they anticipated that their patent would be rejected. 
On both groups of patents there is no public information available.  
 
We therefore concentrate on the patents in the pool. From (1) we infer that these patents have a 
higher value to the pool P than the average patent17. Further we infer that these patents qualify by 
the characteristics X of their holders. Among patents accepted by the pool, the value of the patent 
to the pool and the characteristics of the patent holder are substitutes. A patent held by a firm with 
less favorable characteristics needs to be of higher value to the pool in order to be accepted. 
Patents introduced into pools by firms with more favorable characteristics can include patents of 
low intrinsic value that would not have been accepted if submitted by a firm with less favorable 
characteristics. If P and X are independent, we expect that among patents in the pool the average 
value to the pool of patents held by firms with more favorable characteristics is lower: 
( )P f X
−=  for all 1Iπ =    (2) 
 
The assumption of independence between P and X is a rather strong assumption only for general 
firm characteristics such as the size of the patent portfolio. Arguably, these firms have a different 
propensity to patent, which impacts the average quality of their patent. The characteristics of a firm 
with respect to a pool should however not be correlated with its general propensity to patent. 
 
All other things being equal, we expect the value of the patent for a pool to depend positively upon 
the technological significance of the underlying invention. We will refer to this factor as the 
patent’s (intrinsic) quality Q. 
( )P f Q
+=  for all 1Iπ =    (3) 
 
                                                 
17 Notice that Delcamp (2009) finds that pool patents are of better quality than patents in a control group 
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The relationship between Q and P is positive by assumption. We assume that the pool values patent 
quality, without explicitly testing it. We do not suggest that patent quality is an explicit criterion of 
choice, but that all other things being equal patents chosen by pools are of better quality. The 
reader is referred to Delcamp (2009) for an empirical verification of this assumption. 
 
Many characteristics of a firm can determine its capacity to introduce patents into a patent pool. In 
order to capture as many effects as possible, we will define X as a vector of firm characteristics, 
some of which are general firm characteristics, others specific to the relationship between the firm 
and this particular patent pool, and still others specific to the relationship between the firm, the 
particular pool and the particular patent.  
 
( )1 2, ,..., nX f x x x=   (4) 
In the following econometric analyses, we will in particular test the following characteristics of a 
firm ix with respect to a pool jp  regarding a patent kπ : 
 
Insider ( ix , jp , kπ ) a dummy variable which is 1 if company ix  was already member of the pool  
jp  before the input of the patent kπ  
Ppprior ( ix , jp , kπ ) the share of patents in pool jp  held by company ix   before the input of the 
patent kπ  
Vertical ( ix , jp ) a dummy variable which is 1 if company ix  is a licensee of pool jp  
Corpsize ( ix ) An indicator of the size of company ix . 
Portfolio ( ix ) The number of patents held by company ix . 
 
We will thus proceed to estimate the following (linear) equation against the database of all patents 
introduced into existing patent pools: 
 
i j i j
i j i i
(x ,p , ) (x ,p , )
(x ,p ) (x ) (x )
k k k
p
Q Insider Pprior Vertical
Corpsize Portfolio
π
π
α π β π χ
δ φ ϑ ω ε
= × + × + ×
+ × + × + ×Ω + ×Ω +    (II) 
 
πΩ  and pΩ  are vectors of control variables on characteristics of the patent and the pool. As 
discussed, the quality of a patent will be approximated by a set of different indicators. If firm 
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characteristics play any role in determining the acceptation of the patent by the pool, the direction 
of the relationship between X and Q is necessarily negative. By definition the bargaining power X 
positively influences the inclusion of a patent in a pool, and thus by assumption it is negatively 
correlated with the patent’s quality. The results of the regression thus establish whether the 
particular firm characteristics determine the firm’s bargaining power and if so in what direction. 
 
Results  
 
We successively test this hypothesis on the total number of citations, the number of external cites, 
the number of claims and the family size of the patent. We run successively Poisson and negative 
binomial estimates on each indicator. We run these regressions on all patents except patents 
included at the pool creation (founding patents). Indeed, it is impossible to calculate the 
explanatory variables (such as the power in the pool at the time of inclusion) for these patents. In 
order to control for the patents’ characteristics (age, citing year and application year), we use the 
approach proposed by Mehta, Rysman and Simcoe (2008) based on the assumption that the 
citation age process begins when a patent is granted. This alternative approach allows to control, in 
the same regression, for the age, citation year and application year effect of the patent.18 
 
  
Poisson All 
citations 
Negative 
binomial All 
citations 
Poisson 
External 
cites 
Negative 
binomial 
External 
cites 
Poisson 
number 
claims 
Negative 
binomial 
number_claims 
Poisson 
Family size
Negative 
binomial 
Family 
size 
Outsiders 0.55548*** 0.50148*** 0.33763* 0.27275* -0.06273 -0.04477 0.08680 0.09170 
 (0.151) (0.142) (0.143) (0.135) (0.119) (0.113) (0.153) (0.137) 
Power in the 
pool 0.23409 0.22076 -0.10469 -0.13383 -0.11783 -0.10840 0.07229 -0.43808 
 (0.407) (0.427) (0.330) (0.350) (0.422) (0.419) (0.753) (0.694) 
Vertical 
Integration 0.25333 0.16040 0.23518 0.20623 -0.10828 -0.03429 0.61273** 0.42915* 
 (0.157) (0.158) (0.146) (0.140) (0.141) (0.156) (0.237) (0.189) 
Company 
size -20.7131*** -20.17550** -18.00160** -16.187506* -4.97980 -5.27282 8.01548 -4.46581 
 (5.529) (6.421) (5.587) (6.535) (6.413) (6.555) (12.981) (9.189) 
Patent 
portfolio - 0.00001 - 0.00001 - 0.00001 - 0.00001 0.000015*** 0.000014*** - 0.00003* -0.00002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (3.56E-06) (3.77E-06) (0.001) (6.74E-06) 
Age input - 0.00491* -0.00341 -0.00343 -0.00142 -0.00232 -0.00262 -0.00743 -0.00484 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Age patent 0.08321 0.09037 0.08353 0.09808 -0.04084 -0.03368 -0.09313 -0.08426 
                                                 
18 For a discussion of this hypothesis, see : Mehta, Rysman, Simcoe, «Identifying the age profile of patent citations», 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 
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 (0.075) (0.081) (0.069) (0.072) (0.057) (0.056) (0.247) (0.150) 
Citing year  0.15731* 0.22227** 0.16497** 0.23781*** 0.09392 0.10637 0.23750 0.16115 
 (0.067) (0.079) (0.060) (0.069) (0.057) (0.063) (0.214) (0.139) 
Technological 
class effect -0.00048 -0.00099 -0.00071 -0.00129* -0.00002 -0.00021 -0.00093 -0.00070 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Application 
year effect -0.09178 - 0.12960* -0.08273 - 0.11181* -0.09342 -0.09687* 0.04363 0.04928 
 (0.059) (0.064) (0.054) (0.056) (0.051) (0.049) (0.224) (0.137) 
Constant -129.0434* -183.27743* -162.0797** -249.6022** 1.55497 -16.49392 -558.9418** 
-
417.439***
  (61.376) (89.008) (59.258) (81.858) (66.292) (72.297) (179.705) (90.085) 
Regressions based on equation 2 with robust standard errors. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Pool dummy 
control variables not reported. 
 
Table 2 : Equation 2 results 
 
Table 3 highlights two important and interesting results. First of all, patents broughts by outsiders 
are of better quality. This result is verified for each indicator based on the patent number of 
citations. But this result could have three different complementary effects. The first one is that 
outsiders tend to present first patents of better quality to maximize their chances of joining the 
pool. The other one is that insiders have power over the decision to insert or not a patent and can 
therefore introduce patents of lower quality. The last one is that insiders benefit from an 
asymmetry of information enabling them to include patents more easily. It is difficult to isolate the 
effect of each of these explanations on the overall result but we can emphasize that patents 
included by outsiders are of better quality than patents included by insiders.  
   
V. How do firm characteristics matter? 
 
Hypotheses 
 
There remains an important issue to clarify. The fact that we find firm characteristics to be 
correlated with patent quality could be explained by two different sets of arguments. As to a first 
theory, some firms are able to introduce patents of lower value to the pool because they have better 
bargaining power ( )XΨ . These firms can induce a pool to accept a patent that it would have 
rejected if it was submitted by a firm with lower bargaining power: 
 
( ( ), )I f X P= Ψ   (5)  
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In particular the better ability of insiders to introduce low-value patents could be explained by 
bargaining power. Patent pool administrators and patent evaluators are paid by pool members. It is 
reasonable to argue that they maximize the welfare of the pool members. Patents presented by 
outsiders are thus only accepted if the value they add to the pool more than compensates pool 
members for the decrease of their share in pool income. Patents introduced by pool members 
modify shares of individual pool members, but do not reduce the joint shares of all members. 
Patents submitted by insiders should thus be accepted as soon as they add some value to the pool. 
On a different stance, pool administrators could have a further incentive to reject patents presented 
by companies that are not yet pool members: accepting such patents means that their holders 
become pool members. If the pool increases, joint decision making becomes costlier and the risk of 
non-cooperative strategies increases. 
By contrast to pool insiders, vertically integrated firms (patent holders that are also licensees of the 
same pool) may have weaker bargaining power. Licensees of a pool have an additional incentive to 
become pool members: being member of the pool allows them to participate at fixing the price of 
licenses. If vertically integrated firms are members of a pool, they fix a lower royalty rate, in order 
to reduce their downstream production costs. For the other pool members, this shift away from the 
income-maximizing royalty rate is an additional cost. They will thus accept patents submitted by 
their licensees only if the value they add to the pool at least compensates for this cost. 
 
Also more general firm characteristics can play a role. For instance we find that firms with a larger 
patent portfolio are able to introduce patents of lower value. This finding clearly points to 
arguments on bargaining power. It can be e.g. due to the fact that firms owning many patents are 
more attractive technological allies, or that they are more likely to build up a competitive threat to 
the pool if their patents are rejected. A patent administrator is also more likely to cherish these 
firms, as they may become necessary for further pool projects. 
 
But there is another explanation that is alternative or complementary to the theory of bargaining 
power. This second explanation states that the acceptance of the patent by the pool is determined 
by the patent’s quality and a further patent characteristic which is correlated with firm 
characteristics. Some firms would thus be more able to introduce patents of low quality into the 
pool not because they have stronger bargaining power (which would allow them to obtain more 
easily inclusion of their patent at given patent characteristics), but rather because they have patents 
that at given quality are better suited for the pool: 
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( ( , ( )))I f P Q X= Θ   (6) 
 
We will call this factor the “focus on the standard” of a patent. We use our new indicator to 
approximate the focus. At given patent quality, patents that are more focused on the standard are 
more likely to be accepted by the pool. By analogy to (2), we thus obtain: 
( )Q f= Θ  for all 1Iπ =   (7) 
 
We directly proceed to estimate this equation against the data: 
 
( )
k k p
Qπ πα π ϑ ϑ ε= ×Θ + ×Ω + ×Ω +   (III) 
 
Results 
 
We successively test this hypothesis on the total number of citations (allnscites), the number of 
external cites and the family size of the patent. We can not use the number of claims as an 
indicator for this regression because this variable is used to define the variable focus standard. We 
run successively Poisson and negative binomial estimates on each indicator. In order to control for 
the patents’ characteristics (age, citing year and application year), we use the approach proposed 
by Mehta, Rysman and Simcoe (2008) based on the assumption that the citation age process begins 
when a patent is granted. 
 
  
Poisson All 
citations 
Negative 
binomial All 
citations 
Poisson 
External cites 
Negative 
binomial 
External cites 
Poisson 
Family size 
Negative 
binomial 
Family size 
Focus 
standard -0.41215 -0.12382 -0.18651 -0.03298 0.54485 0.86961 
 (0.386) (0.179) (0.241) (0.139) (0.281) (0.480) 
Focus 
standard late   -39.67314*** -36.06864*** -41.55403***  -39.20032***   13.26395*   
 
14.96158*** 
 (2.804) (2.998) (2.806) (2.905) (6.293) (3.433) 
Age patent 0.21825***  0.24041***  0.18384**  0.20649***  -0.12230 -0.06593 
 (0.055) (0.059) (0.057) (0.0606) (0.219) (0.092) 
Citing year   0.23673***   0.32167***   0.24705*** 0.32260***  -0.01875 -0.03079 
 (0.056) (0.075) (0.053) (0.072) (0.090) (0.070) 
Technological 
class effect - 0.00082 -0.00095 -0.00091 -0.00116* -0.00106 -0.00094 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Application 
year effect 0.04269 -0.00298 0.02304 -0.00808 0.03610 0.07609 
 (0.046) (0.054) (0.047) (0.051) (0.210) (0.088) 
Constant  -558.0160*** -637.0473*** -538.9346***  -628.2071***  -29.92318 -86.3895 
  (144.208) (163.633) (146.111) (168.985) (503.767) (233.336) 
Regressions based on equation 3 with robust standard errors. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** 
p<0.001. Pool dummy control variables not reported. 
 
Table 3 : Equation 3 results 
 
As we can see in table 4, our hypothesis that quality is negatively correlated with the focus 
standard of the patent and thus that quality and focus standard are substitutes in order to include a 
patent in the pool is verified. This hypothesis is verified for all indicators based on the number of 
citations. This result is not verified when we take into account the family size of the patent as an 
indicator of quality. But, in this case, it is difficult to use the family size as an indicator of quality. 
Indeed, the family size is linked to the width of the patent and then to the focus standard of the 
patent.  
 
We next test if the focus of the patent on the standard is function of firm characteristics. This is 
particularly plausible for characteristics of the firm with respect to the pool. For instance pool 
members, but also licensees of the pool, could have an information advantage over outsiders that 
allows them to better adjust their research projects or even the wording of their patent files in order 
to match the criteria of essentiality. As such adjustment is not necessarily instantaneous, we also 
use lagged variables and variables on duration. 
 
Precisely, we will estimate the following equation: 
( ) ( , , ) _ ( , , )
( , , ) ( , )
k i j k i j k
i j k i j p
Insider x p lag Insider x p
Seniority x p Vertical x p π
π α π β π χ
π δ ϑ ω ε
Θ = × + × + ×
+ × + ×Ω + ×Ω +  (IV) 
 
 
 
  
Poisson Focus standard 
Negative binomial Focus 
standard 
Model 1 : Regressions without lag outsiders 
 - 0.34761**   - 0.34761** Outsiders 
(0.115) (0.115) 
0.00011 0.00011 Seniority 
(0.003) (0.003) 
0.01523 0.01523 Vertical integration 
(0.301) (0.301) 
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Age patent 0.04288 0.04288 
 (0.069) (0.069) 
Citing year  - 0.18618*  - 0.18618*  
 (0.077) (0.077) 
0.00103 0.00103 Technological class 
effect (0.001) (0.001) 
Application year effect 0.16891* 0.16891* 
 (0.077) (0.077) 
Constant 32.02910 32.02910 
 (158.630) (158.63) 
Model 2 : Regressions with lag outsiders 
- 0.49039*    - 0.49039* Outsiders 
(0.220) (0.220) 
0.00893 0.00893 Seniority 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 0.49091**    0.49091**   Vertical integration 
(0.190) (0.190) 
Age patent 0.07608 0.07608 
 (0.114) (0.114) 
Citing year  0.26844 0.26844 
 (0.170) (0.170) 
- 0.00015 - 0.00015 Technological class 
effect (0.001) (0.001) 
Application year effect - 0.01103 - 0.01103 
 (0.108) (0.108) 
Constant - 518.88275 - 518.88275 
  (407.142) (407.14) 
Regressions based on equation 4 with robust standard errors. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** 
p<0.001. Pool dummy control variables not reported. 
 
Table 4 : Equation 4 results 
 
As we can see in table 5, the regression on focus standard brings out two important results 
confirming the information asymmetry hypothesis. First of all, outsiders (not already member of 
the pool) include patents less focused on the standard than insiders. This can be explained by the 
information asymmetry enjoyed by outsiders relative to insiders (they better know expectations 
and technological boundaries of the pool). This result is reinforced by a positive and significant 
coefficient for the vertical integration variable meaning that vertically integrated patent holders 
include patents more focused on the standard than non vertically integrated firms. This seems 
consistent with our assumption on information asymmetry because vertically integrated firms have 
better knowledge of the technological scope of the project and therefore also benefit from an 
information asymmetry compared to non-integrated firms.  
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Corrolary : Timing of patent application 
 
 
There have been recently some academic contributions investigating the timing of patent 
application in the context of patent pools. In a theoretical paper, Dequiedt and Versaevel (2007) 
apply models of patent races to the case of pool creation. The authors suggest that participation in 
a pool increases the returns on patents. Potential entrants into pools have to bargain with pool 
members about the conditions of entry. It is assumed that candidates for entry have no bargaining 
power respective to the pool members (as is confirmed by the data in our sample).  
 
Founding members of patents pools can thus expropriate from entrants the additional returns on 
patents due to patent pool participation. From this fundamental hypothesis, Dequiedt and 
Versaevel derive that there is a strong incentive to be among the founding members of a pool. 
Consequently, they expect firms to conduct R&D races in the period just before pool creation. The 
authors expect these races to be reflected in an increase of patent applications in the period 
preceding pool creation, with a pique of applications just before the launch of the pool. Once the 
pool is created, patent applications fall immediately to a low level. 
 
This pattern of patent applications has been empirically verified by Lampe and Moser for the case 
of the sewing machines patent pool from the 19th century. Lampe and Moser nevertheless argue 
that this strong increase in patent applications does not reflect a culmination in R&D activity, but 
rather a strong increase in strategic patent applications. Prospective pool members could have 
patented more in order to strengthen their bargaining power in the pool. Pool outsiders have 
incentives to patent more in order to protect themselves against the increased risk of patent 
litigation due to the pooling of litigation resources by pool members. Consistently with the theory 
of strategic patent files, Lampe and Moser find that innovation slowed rather than speeded up 
during the period leading to pool formation.  
 
Our own sample allows examining this question with data from different contemporary patent 
pools. Figure 5 shows the time profile of patent application relative to pool creation for the U.S. 
patents in our sample. The graph is at odds with the predictions of Versaevel and Dequiedt and the 
findings of Lampe and Moser, as nearly half of the patents currently in the pools have been filed 
after pool creation. Patent applications pique several years after pool creation. 
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Figure 6 : Timing of patent application 
 
 
Note that there is a truncation problem for patent applications occurring 3 years or more after pool 
creation, as the most recent pool creation takes place in 2002, and patent application dates are 
provided until 2005. This problem biases downwards the number of patent applications on the 
right-hand side of the chart. For patents filed more than four years after pool creation, this 
truncation problem concerns several pools. Therefore the chart stops at pool creation plus four 
years. Due to truncation, the pique of applications may be even later than suggested by the chart. 
 
By contrast to Lampe and Moser, we do not observe that patent applications decrease after the 
creation of the pool. We would expect a pique in patent applications immediately before pool 
creation if it was only possible or at least easier to introduce strategic patents at the launch of the 
pool, and holders of proprietary technology thus hurry to be in possession of numerous patents at 
the time of pool creation. This might have been the case of the 19th century pool observed by 
Lampe and Moser, to which no further patents have been added after the year of launch. By 
contrast, we have shown that in our sample of contemporary pools it is easier for firms to introduce 
numerous low-value patents once they are pool members. Recall that a big majority of patents 
introduced into existing pools are brought in by companies that already before held some patents in 
the pool. It is thus consistent with our general assumptions that we find most patents to be filed 
once the pool has taken off and firms have ascertained their membership. Nevertheless, our sample 
of modern patent pools confirms the findings of Lampe and Moser that pools provide incentives 
for strategic patent files. 
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Conclusion 
 
Building upon a very comprehensive fact finding work, we are able to provide a first empirical 
analysis of the dynamics of contemporary patent pools. This analysis provides evidence that pool 
introduce numerous low-value patents, increasing their share in the royalty revenue. We reveal that 
most patents are introduced into the pool after the launch of the licensing program. Only a minority 
of these late-comers are patents owned by outsiders, i.e. by companies that have not been pool 
members before. The quality of the patents introduced by pool members significantly decreases 
over time. At any given age of the pool, insiders and powerful R & D companies are able to 
introduce patents of lower quality than outsiders and firms with small patent portfolios. This 
advantage is probably due to two complementary factors: insiders know the patent pool better, 
which allows them to better adjust their patent files; and insiders and powerful R & D firms are 
strong bargainers.  
We think that these facts need to be borne in mind while assessing the welfare effects of specific 
patent pool projects. The very objective of a patent pool is to reduce transaction costs associated 
with the patent thicket. In order to fulfill their function, patent pools need to provide incentives that 
encourage innovation, but discourage rent-seeking strategic patent files. The rules on revenue 
sharing and on the evaluation of patent essentiality are crucial to that respect, and deserve more 
attention from policy makers concerned with the competitive effects of patent pool programs. 
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Annex 1 : Summary statistics 
 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Variables regarding patent 
Appyear Year patent applied for 1998.226 3.959 1981 2006 
Gyear Year patent granted 2000.418 4.021 1983 2006 
Nclass U.S. patent technology class (3 
digit) 
394.358 82.491 84 725 
Allnscites Total cites flow (truncation 
corrected) from other companies 
17.916 29.404 0 251.334 
Genindex Generality of the patent (NBER U.S. 
database) 
0.33062 0.366 0 1 
Claims Number of claims for the patent 4.939 9.606 1 99 
Family_size Family size for the patent calculated 
from espacenet 
30.371 83.237 1 700 
External_cites Cites received from patent not in the 
pool 
20.5383 30.02179 0 270.467 
Internal_cites Cites received from patent not in the 
pool 
2.567 6.579 0 88 
Year_ 
disclosure_SSO 
Disclosure year of the patent in the 
SSO 
1998.821 3.601 1993 2007 
 
Variables regarding the timing 
Age_input Age of the input calculated from the 
pool creation date (in months) 
40.261  29.522 0 139 
 
Age_at_input Patent age at the input date (in 
years) 
5.441 
 
2.919 0.199 19.25 
 
Number_input Chronological number of input into 
this pool 
2.690 2.268 0 11 
 
Age_at_creatio
n 
Age of the patent at the pool 
creation date (in years) 
4.431 3.696 - 3.90 20.5 
Late Age_input * Age_at_input (Late 
introduction of patent that 
previously exist) 
214.254 229.972 0 2318.98
6 
New_late Late * dummy_new_entrant (patent 
introduced late by company that 
were not previously member of the 
pool) 
43.940 146.864 0 1550.39 
Old_late Late * dummy_old_entrant (patent 
introduced late by company that 
were reviously member of the pool) 
 
170.314 215.168 0 2318.98 
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Variables regarding firms 
Ppprior Number of patents previously in the 
pool held by the firm 
(Number of patents previously held 
by the firm in the pool / Number of 
patents previously in the pool) 
 
0.136 0.141 0 0.7 
Corpsize Size of the company (based on 
ranking in Fortune 500 and 
Global2000 index) 
0.001 0.002 0.001 .042 
Patent_portfolio Size of the company patent portfolio 
(2009 U.S. patent application * 
number of patents espacenet) 
10637.84 13956.52 0 50932 
Variables regarding the patent essentiality 
Sections Number of standard sections for 
which the patent is cited 
4.236 2.913 1 24 
Subsections Number of standard subsections for 
which the patent is cited 
13.884 10.839 1 88 
Sections 
corrected 
Number of standard sections for 
which the patent is cited / median 
number of standard sections 
1.411 0.945 .25 8.73333
4 
Subsections 
corrected 
Number of standard subsections for 
which the patent is cited / median 
number of standard subsections 
1.411 0.945 .25 8.73333
4 
Focus_standard Number of claims / Number of 
sections corrected 
3.523 3.140 .02127
66 
24 
 
 
 
 
Distribution of focus_standard
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Annex 2 : Robustness check 1  
Regression results without DVD 6C patents 
 
 
 
 
  
Poisson All 
citations 
Poisson External 
cites 
Poisson number 
claims 
Poisson Family 
size 
Regressions with generality index 
Age input - 0.00824** - 0.00721** - 0.00137 - 0.00021 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age patent 0.33046* 0.36202** - 0.00241 - 0.16559 
 (0.137) (0.140) (0.104) (0.102) 
Citing year  - 0.03531 - 0.01852 - 0.03137 0.03939 
 (0.111) (0.106) (0.120) (0.104) 
Technological 
class effect 0.01052 0.00755 - 0.00666 0.00583 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Application 
year effect 0.20869 0.23454 0.04518 0.01973 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.096) (0.086) 
Patent 
generality 0.39476 0.34853 0.34408 0.11103 
 (0.487) (0.505) (0.554) (0.335) 
Constant - 347.14676*** - 431.14628*** - 22.10889 - 117.1262 
  (99.780) (109.869) (146.016) (97.857) 
Regressions based on equation 1 with robust standard errors. Legend: * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Pool dummy control variables not reported. 
 
Table 6 : Equation 1 results on non DVD 6C patents 
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Poisson All citations 
Poisson External 
cites 
Poisson number 
claims Poisson Family size
Outsiders 0.11780 0.00968 - 0.04434 0.33371* 
 (0.192) (0.201) (0.163) (0.137) 
Power in the pool 
- 2.41286* - 2.57494** - 0.39533 1.30620* 
 (0.940) (0.996) (0.974) (0.622) 
Vertical 
Integration 0.06596 0.14401 - 0.31493 0.09537 
 (0.210) (0.220) (0.178) (0.182) 
Company size - 3.46081 - 3.51E+00 2.08505 - 5.54131 
 (3.419) (3.526) (4.787) (8.729) 
Patent portfolio 
- 0.00001* - 9.54E-06 0.00002*** - 0.00001* 
 (0.000) (5.80E-06) (4.92E-06) (5.23E-06) 
Age input - 0.00733** - 0.00615* 0.00119 0.00086 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age patent 0.16240* 0.17873* - 0.04130 - 0.04074 
 (0.076) (0.074) (0.063) (0.072) 
Citing year  0.06639 0.07335 0.09672 0.05533 
 (0.070) (0.066) (0.068) (0.083) 
Technological class 
effect - 0.00013 0.00008 0.00547 - 0.00497* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Application year 
effect - 0.00733 0.00303 - 0.09064 0.09998 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.059) (0.067) 
Constant - 115.28009 - 149.94234 - 11.49644 - 305.69331*** 
  (77.532) (80.431) (91.036) (81.866) 
Regressions based on equation 2 with robust standard errors. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** 
p<0.001. Pool dummy control variables not reported. 
 
Table 7 : Equation 2 results on non DVD 6C patents 
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Poisson All 
citations 
Poisson 
External cites 
Poisson Family 
size 
- 0.23598 - 0.20019  0.44079* 
Focus standard 
(0.375) (0.367) (0.179) 
- 41.70668***  - 41.65932***  13.38265***  
Focus standard late 
file 
(4.005) (4.060) (3.501) 
Age patent  0.24897***   0.26817***   - 0.09182 
 (0.070) (0.072) (0.064) 
Citing year  0.01035 - 0.00052 - 0.00401 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.074) 
Technological class 
effect - 0.00158 - 0.00129 - 0.00167 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Application year 
effect 0.06806 0.08867 0.09876 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) 
Constant - 153.37592 - 173.02543* - 185.46846* 
  (84.709) (85.345) (73.701) 
Regressions based on equation 3 with robust standard errors. Legend: * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Pool dummy control variables not 
reported. 
 
Table 8 : Equation 3 results on non DVD 6C patents 
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Poisson Focus standard Negative binomial Focus standard 
Model : Regressions without lag outsiders 
- 0.36419**    - 0.36419** Outsiders 
(0.123) (0.123) 
- 0.00023 - 0.00023 
Seniority 
(0.003) (0.003) 
0.12031 0.12031 
Vertical integration 
(0.312) (0.312) 
Age patent 0.04246 0.04246 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
Citing year   - 0.21227* - 0.21227*  
 (0.103) (0.103) 
0.00136 0.00136 Technological class 
effect (0.001) (0.001) 
0.16979* 0.16979* Application year 
effect (0.077) (0.077) 
Constant 83.49811 83.49811 
 (90.429) (90.429) 
Regressions based on equation 4 with robust standard errors. Legend: * p<0.05; 
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Pool dummy control variables not reported. 
 
Table 9 : Equation 4 results on non DVD 6C patents 
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Annex 3 : Robustness check 2 
Regression results without control for generality index 
 
  
Poisson All 
citations 
Negative 
binomial All 
citations 
Poisson 
External 
cites 
Negative 
binomial 
External 
cites 
Poisson 
number 
claims 
Negative 
binomial 
number_claims 
Poisson 
Family 
size 
Negative 
binomial 
Family size 
Model 1 : Regressions without generality index 
Age input - 0.00968**  - 0.00839**  - 0.00626* -0.00487 - 0.00596*  - 0.00601** -0.01046 -0.00552 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) 
Age patent 0.22870***   0.28176*** 0.20083***
 
0.24112***  0.04116 0.04158 -0.19631 - 0.17921*  
 (0.049) (0.063) (0.046) (0.058) (0.042) (0.046) (0.133) (0.079) 
Citing year 
effect  0.38035*** 0.46119*** 
 
0.36458***  
 
0.44229*** 0.03221 0.01708 0.12635 0.01594 
 (0.076) (0.096) (0.072) (0.092) (0.077) (0.085) (0.230) (0.134) 
Technological 
class effect - 0.00162* -0.00148  -.00177** 
 - 
0.00179** -0.00109 -0.0011 - 0.00151* - 0.00137* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Application 
year effect - 0.05706 -0.1209 -0.04945 -0.07683 -0.05626 -0.06578 0.04827 0.04889 
 (0.068) (1.67) (0.065) (0.065) (0.057) (0.060) (0.275) (0.163) 
Constant -759.763***  -922.167***  
-
727.743*** 
 - 
883.712***  -61.33882 -31.03179 - 246.6916 - 26.18047 
 (151.744) (193.048) (144.662) (183.999) (154.455) (170.592) (460.705) (269.801) 
Regressions based on equation 1 with robust standard errors. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Pool dummy 
control variables not reported. 
Table 5 : Equation 1 results 
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 Annex 4 : Example of essentiality report for DVD 6C essential 
patents 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
